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On December 4th, 1998 at 3:36 AM STS-88 (the space shuttle Endeavor) was launched 
with the "Node 1 Unity Module" in its payload bay. After working on the Space Station 
program for a very long time, that launch was one of the most beautiful sights I had ever 
seen! As the Shuttle proceeded to rendezvous with the Russian! American module know 
as Zarya, I returned to Houston quickly to start monitoring the activation of the software I 
had spent the last 3 years workinE.on. ; 
, I 
The FGB module (also known as "Zarya") , was grappled by the shuttle robotic arm, and 
connected to the Unity module. Crewmembers then hooked up the power and data 
connections between Zarya and Unity. On Deaerpber 7 ih , 1998 at 9:49 PM CST the Node 
Control Software was activated. On Dec~ber 15 ih , 1998, the Node-lIZarya 
"cornerstone" of the International ?pace Station was left on-orbit. 
·i 
The Node Control Software (liCS) is the first software flown by NASA for the 
International Space Station (ISS). The ISS P~ogram is considered the most complex 
international engineering effort ever undertaken. At last count some 18 countries are 
active partners in this global venture. NCS has performed all of its intended functions on 
orbit, over 200 miles above us . I'll be describing how we built the NCS software. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100033623 2019-08-30T12:02:00+00:00Z
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Figure 1. Node 1 Computer~M location on-orbit 
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The Challenges 
The NCS is coded in Ada, and hosted on an embedded processor with fairly tight 
resource constraints (2 ME of RAM, 1 ME of "storage" and a 12 MHz. Processor). This 
computer is referred to as a MultiplexerlDe-multiplexer (MDM). 
Early in the assembly sequence of the station, the NCS is the "master" computer; 
however later on it is one of the "slave" or lower tier computers. NCS controls many of 
its lower tier components for only a "relatively" short period of time. The hardware below 
the NCS is not symmetrical, meaning in some cases a device is capable of being 
controlled by either MDM, but in other cases only one MDM can control a device. Most 
of the station's computers do not need to function on a "shifting ground work". 
System "Vide Synergy and Interactions 
A summary, high level overview, or context diagram, of the NCS functions and it 's 
external interfaces is shown in figure 2, while each of the NCS functions per subsystem is 
summarized in Table 2. I say high level because this illustration summarizes some 300 
distinct interfaces; some digital; but· most are analog! . ' 
Command Sources 
and Data Monitoring 
Communication 
Equipment 
Figure 2. NCS "Context Diagram" - The Node control software is represented here 
with its interfaces to the external sys tems. The topside of the figure represents command 
sources, and telemetry or data sinks. The bottom side of the figure represents the direct 
hardware connections for the NCS. The left side shows some of the device interfaces 
pertaining to station assembly and operations, while the right side represents interfaces 
with digital or 1553 devices 
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T bi 2 NCS C t I f S b t a e . on ro 0 u sys ems 
Subsystem NCS Function 
Electric Power • Monitors power and energy usage 
System (EPS) • Monitors power distribution equipment. 
• Recovers failures of power computers 
• Performs "load sheds" if too much power is used. 
Environmental • Controls Ventilation (fans and valves) 
Control • Monitors for fires and isolates modules if needed 
• Air quality sampling 
Thermal Control • Monitors temperatures and Controls Structural and Avionics 
and heaters (over 100) 
• Controls heat exchanger between internal and external 
thermal systems . 
Assembly • Controls the Space Station's propulsion systems when the 
Operations Shuttle docks 
• ControJs.la.tches and bolts for, module attachment 
, 
NCS has been designed to deal with many different external hardware configurations, as 
the on-orbit assembly of the Station is completed. Some of the major configuration 
changes of the station are shown in Figure 3. ~ The software was designed to deal with 
these configuration changes by allowing the different configurations to be selected by 
operator command or changes to 9ata tables . Another major challenge was that only one 
software load was to be built for"both computers, even though the hardware connected 
below the computers is not symmetrical. This challenge was dealt with by configuring 
the software to deal with all hardware permutations and having computer specific data 
tables . 
SA Fli 
Figure 3. Station Configurations on Different Flights. As new hardware is added the 
software must adapt to the changing configurations. 
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Building the Software 
I was assigned responsibility for the Software Requirements Specification (SRS) in 
March of 1995 , 3 months later we completed our Software Specification Review (SSR). 
The 3 years from start to flight definitely seemed to be in fast forward. 
At the macroscopic level we followed the traditional MIL-STD-2167 A "waterfall" life 
cycle, with a set of serial reviews of the requirements , design and tests. Some of the 
practices we adopted which were helpful are described here . 
Define the importance of the Problem - Early in the life cycle a board consisting of 
contractor management (requirements, design and test) authorized changes to the 
software. Eventually these boards were expanded to include NASA, safety, and 
operations personnel. When this joint contractor NASA board was chartered they wisely 
decided that different issue had different operational consequences or severity's. 
Previously our team would work issues as quickly as possible, but often without seeing 
"the forest for the trees". With severity's attached to the issues, we could figure out 
which ones we absolutely needed to fix. The next class of fixes we would do our best to 
fix as time allowed. In some cases; we would not ·fix rrlinor problems/annoyances at all. 
"Live with it" - One of the philosophical changes in the transItIOn from the "Space 
Station Freedom" program to the "InternatiQnal Space Station" was a new spirit of 
compromise and acceptance, often epitomized ~y the saying "Can you live with it?" 
Since we realized that not everything had to be fixed , we ended up defining operational 
notes, which would alert the operators to items where the software behaved strangely or 
in conflict with the requirements . On flight 2A, the NCS and the early portable computer 
system were flown with approximately 100 of these operational notes. Most were minor 
annoyances or only likely to occur after several failures. Most have since been fixed in 
the "follow on" releases of software. 
Find Solutions Outside of your Box - Since the NCS was the first CSCI to be delivered, 
the NCS team was often straddled with the job of having to define processes in addition 
to executing to those processes. It was a rare occasion that an existing "space station 
process" was available for use or adaptation. Occasionally shuttle program experiences 
and processes provided useful guidance, and inspiration (e.g. "They figured it out, so can 
we !"). 
Test the Heck out of the Software - Three different test environments provided 
feedback into the NCS software development effort. The 3 different test environments 
were: 
• Flight Qualification Testing (FQT) - exhaustive testing of the software based on 
SRS requirements, this is done in the lab with simulated external interfaces. We 
found most of the "logic" errors in this environment. These tests were normally. 
executed using scripts, which caused changes to input data, and monitoring of 
NCS response(s). 
• Stage Testing - higher fidelity functional testing of the software with other flight 
equivalent computers, including real software. We found timing and data transfer 
problems in this environment. The stage and integration testing were primarily 
done manually with test procedures, since most of this testing followed operator 
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in the loop procedures, which could not be easily automated, since they were 
operated from a portable computer. 
• H/YV and SfW Integration Testing (HSI)- Highest fidelity testing of the 
software with the flight hardware, using the actual launch package. This is where 
we found out about problems with "real hardware" . 
Plan for Problems - In the beginning, every test failure sent our team into a "tail spin", 
but as time moved on we began to expect that tests would cause updates to our software 
and we started planning accordingly. 
• Problems are not the Enemy - After each series of tests, the CS development team 
was presented with a new set of problems to unravel and analyze. Determining the root 
cause of a problem is often difficult when one takes into consideration, multiple software 
loads, data product definitions, test procedures, assumptions, test environment problems, 
and actual planned operational usage. The original testing schedule was serial (first FQT, 
then Stage, then HSI) , but schedule concerns eventually forced some testing activities to 
be done in parallel. There was also no real reason they had to be done in a serial fashion , 
since to a large extent the testing was "orthogonal" and not overlapping. After the initial 
testing was done, we would build a new release 'or'the software (based on approved 
issues) and go back for a "delta" or "regression" test of the software. The FQT teams 
approach to testing was based on scripts; this approach was very far sighted of them, 
since it allowed them to re-run the whole test s1iit~ in 10 to 14 days . 
\ 
. 
Co-Locate - As problems we unc~vered in the code, requirements and interfaces we were 
able to react quickly because mos'{ of our teams were tightly coupled and working in the 
same area. For example the progr;arnmer, tester and data provider were all within 100 feet 
of each other, so the changes to the products could be quickly coordinated and updates 
delivered. On the other hand in the bigger sense of the program, we had to work with 
people in California, Alabama, Florida, Russia, and multiple locations in Houston. 
Define your "First Principles" - I eventually defined what I called the commandments 
or first principals of embedded flight software. While I doubt they are all inclusive, they 
have helped keep us on track. 
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I. Thou shalt not convert to engineering units. 
II. II. Thou shalt provide either a command response or cyclic 
data for each command received .. 
III. Thou shalt confirm all failures before alerting the operators or 
attempting to recover or safe the system. 
IV. Thou shalt retry recovery and safing actions (unless the 
operator has inhibited this response). ' 'Try, try again! " 
V. Thou shalt test thy software with real hardware. 
VI. Thou shalt require two different commands to destroy things, 
three to kill. Don ' t let operator mistakes cause trouble. 
VII. Thou shalt synchronize message ttansfers with an 
incrementing roll-over counter. 
VIII. Thou shalt not open a message unless it is for you. Just route 
it on its way. ~ , 
IX. Thou shalt make everything e'asily modifiable, because you 
rarely know what is going to actually happen. This applies to 
limits , failure confirmations and recovery actions. 
X. Thou shalt reme'mber the operators commanded values, and 
never mislead hirnlher with erroneous data! 
XI. Thou shalt base failure status on the current physical state of 
the system and let the permanent storage of transient 
information be in time stamped logs of the unique event 
changes. Don' t latch the data, unless there is a real good 
reason. 
XII. When all else fails make sure the PEEK and POKE commands 
work. (memory modification). 
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Successes and Failures 
Our big success was the 2A assembly flight of the Space Station. On Flight 2A, also 
referred to as "STS-88" (Space Transportation System Flight 88), the orbiter (e .g. the 
Space Shu ttle) was launched with the node 1 module and PMAI and PMA2 in its payload 
bay. After reaching low earth orbit, the Node 1 module was attached to the airlock in the 
shuttle payload bay. The next major task was to grapple the ZaryaIFGB module and 
attach it to the Node 1 module ; this was performed by the Shuttle's robotic arm. ext we 
hooked up the data and power lines between the FGB and ode 1 modules. See Figure 4 
for photos of some of the assembly operations. 
Docking the FGB to the 
ode 
Astronauts hooking up the 
two modules. 
The International Space 
Station on orbit. 
Figure -L Space Station Assembly and Activation. Some of the major steps in getting 
the In ternational Space Station assembled and activated on orbit in December of 1998. 
At this ~oi nr the orbi ter crew activated the NCS computers, and they began sending data 
to the orbi ter on the status of the station ' s systems. A representative example of the 
displays on the portable computer system is shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Representative early portable uters systems displays of computer 
system status for flight 2A. The feft most window shows the computers and their buses 
in relationship to the Space Station Modules, the center window shows the configuration 
of one of the MDMs and its associated interface cards, while the right window shows the 
built in test results for the MDM. 
The NCS began to monitor the pressure in the node and started operating the Node 1 and 
PMA-l heaters. After the Shuttle returned to Kennedy Space Center, the NCS has 
continued to route telemetry and accepts commands from the ground control stations. 
During this time period the Node 1 is limited to usage of 800 watts of power in most 
configurations. See Figure 6 fo r an example of a ground based monitoring display. 
Ground operators can also use the portable computer type of screens or review historical 
data plots. 
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Figure 6. Ground type of di~play for flight 2A. This screen provides an overall 
overview of the Station and its c6mputer equipment. Parameters are displayed such as: 
built in test results, command cQunters, event counters, power system status, and event 
response inhibits , time, temperatures of the MDMs, and heaters . 
After a year of training and simulations with multiple failures, the ground control team 
was almost disappointed at how smoothly things went during 2A operations. 
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Since we had worked out most of our problems on the ground, the few problems 
encountered on-orbit were minor annoyances and the NCS performed all of its intended 
functions as planned. Some of the "anomalies" or "funnies" in the computer subsystem 
were: 
• Some of the FGB advisory events were toggling causing the advisory log (a 
circular buffer) to be overwritten quicker than we could dump the data to the 
ground. Even though the NCS only logs state changes, these events were toggling 
so quickly that our circular buffer or log of 100 Advisories was soon filled . 
Advisories are the least severe anomaly, and are not normally down-linked to the 
ground. A customized telemetry collection set could be developed to down-link 
them for this early point in the program, but later on, the bandwidth would not be 
available due to the large amount of available advisory data parameters for down-
link. We worked around this problem by inhibiting these events , which caused 
them to quit being logged, the raw data is still stored on the ground, but our on-
orbit buffers are free to log actual new failures. 
• One set of display screens had the C&W events time tag off by four days . This 
has been fixed. 
• The Russian ground station sent 3 commands to the Station which caused the 
FGB-2 MDM to restart, . which in tum .'led 'to the FGB sending the NCS a 
command which was rejected. Proving the international nature of this vehicle, 
analysts and test teams, in both Moscow and Houston determined the root cause 
of this event. It turned out the caus~ was a stale command. Rejecting stale 
commands is one way to make sure a cOm\nand isn ' t executed at the wrong time. 
• Two of the Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) devices were having troubles 
with timeouts on their locai RS-485 buses. Even though the device was within its 
operational temperature range, they were colder than the other two CBMs. After 
heating the surrounding ar~a by activating structural heaters, the CBM testing was 
successful with no 485 timeouts . 
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Conclusions 
Ultimately we were successful, and the STS-88/ISS-2A mission worked , with only minor 
problems. In building the Node Control Software this quickly several mistakes were 
made. Some of the lessons learned were: 
• "Vork Together - Co-locate the primary team focals (e.g. design, test , and 
requirements), if at all possible. Although the team started off co-located, it was 
eventually separated, although technology (e-mail, voice-mail, and telecons) 
allowed us to continue to work successfully, it was easier "face to face" . Co-
location leads to fewer chances for misinterpretation or errors in communication. 
Work toward solutions; instead of identifying the "guilty party" . 
• Categorize - Assign each issue a severity so that an effective work plan can be 
developed. For example: fix all severity 1 and 2 issues, and fix as many severity 3 
issues as possible, fix none of the severity 4 or 5 issues. Assign operational notes 
for issues that are harder to fix than work around operationally. 
• Good lCDs - In a program of the size and scope of the International Space 
Station, the importance of interface control documents (ICDs) can not be over-
emphasized. They also need to be provided in a timely fashion. 
• Modifiable - Make control parameters such as limits, command lists and 
inhibit/enables modifiable. NCS allowed modification to these items by 
commands and/or memory writes. ~ 
• Keep Specifications Simple - Don't ipecify something unless it is actually 
required. Every specification will result in design and test team activities; they 
need to stay focused on th6 important behaviors , not superfluous requirements. 
• Know the Configuration - Know the software and hardware configuration and 
initial conditions before y~u try to solve any problem. If an issue doesn't specify 
this contact the initiator or tester. 
CS is the first Ada code used in Manned Space Flight by NASA (Zarya's FGB MDM is 
also coded in Ada). It was the last computer added to the program and the first delivered 
to NASA: the entire life cycle from SSR to flight was completed in little more than three 
years. NC S has 56 digital interfaces, over 260 hardware iI)terfaces, and 42,000 SLOCs 
(Source Lines Of Code) of Ada. While only using worst case 60% of the available 
computer processor and memory resources (on a 386sx running at 16 MHz, with 2 ME of 
RAM~), in fact most of the time NCS has been running at 20% utilization of the CPU. 
The 13 th release of the CS software was launched on the 13 th flight of the shuttle 
Endeavor. during my 13 th year on the program, showing that sometimes 13 isn'T an 
unlucky number. NCS is truly the first International manned space flight computer, 
interfacing with 2 different Russian computers. 
The Zarya and Unity combination has been called the comer stone of the ISS and in many 
ways it is just that it is where the two great Space powers on earth, are "joined at the hip" . 
The combined vehicle while " small" in comparison to the station at assembly complete is 
still 6 stories high, and 35 tons. While the Apollo Soyuz mission connected Russian and 
United States space vehicles over 20 years ago, this was strictly a mechanical hookup, the 
ISS connection is also power, data and software. 
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As we embark on the new millennium, it is good to know that we can work together on a 
global scale to construct something positive, and have it work! 
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